Behavioral science researchers have long acknowledged that their methods had certain technical limits-errors of measurement, design restrictions, problems of inference, etc.
. The natural sciences, by contrast, developed their methods as a specific response to their particular subject matter. In other words, some understanding of the subject matter came first, and method was later derived to accommodate this understanding (Polkinghorne, 1983; Ronan, 1982) . The behavioral sciences, on the other hand, went about their tasks in the reverse order of the natural sciences. They adopted the method of natural science and, implicitly, its understanding of the world-as the best way to develop their understanding of their subject matter. This privileging of methodwhat some have termed, "methodolatry" (e.g., Danziger, 1990 )-has continued in various forms into the present day.
What has this privileging of method meant for knowledge claims? In other words, how does one find out the validity or accuracy of certain ideas in the behavioral sciences? True to their history, the answer of many behavioral scientists is that scientific method is the main, if not sole, means of discerning an idea's validity (e.g., Heiman, 1995) . One must find a way to submit the idea to empirical test. That is, the important issue is to translate the idea into the procedures of method and allow these procedures to determine its validity. This methodological approach to truth is so dominant that testability is itself thought to be an indicator of the quality or validity of an idea.
For example, in a popular book on psychological theories (Carver & Scheier, 1996) , this dominance is illustrated in a section on "how to decide whether a theory is any good" (p. 8). As the authors put it, "in describing the predictive function of theories, we've revealed a bias that many of today's psychologists hold. The bias is this: theories should be testable and should be tested" (p. 8). In other words, if the idea cannot be readily operationalized, then this raises questions about its quality and significance to the discipline. A theory is not "any good," unless it conforms to the dictates of method. In this sense, method not only dictates the procedures one follows in establishing the validity or accuracy of an idea; method also dictates the criteria for deciding whether and how the idea should be considered in the first place.
Interestingly, these procedures and criteria are rarely questioned in the mainstream of many disciplines; they are taken as scientific givens. Method has long held this unquestioned status, because it is considered invisible or transparent. This transparency is, again, a property of a modernist understanding of method (and language) (Bevan, 1991; Polkinghorne, 1983; Slife & Williams, 1995) . Method is viewed as providing the experimenter with a window to the objective world. As a transparent window, it is not itself thought to have an affect on what the experimenter sees; it does not affect the truth of ideas and events. Indeed, this window is considered to clear away extraneous factors affecting the recognition of truth, so that the objective truth-as it "really is"-is allowed to emerge. In this sense, method has priority over theory and truth, because it is the necessary means by which ideas are tested and truth is attained.
Current scholarship, however, questions this priority in the behavioral sciences (Bohman, 1993; Dennis, 1995; Gadamer, 1982; Harmon, 1993; Jones, 1994; Polkinghorne, 1983; Robinson, 1985; Slife, 1993; cf. Slife & Williams, 1995; Slife & Williams, 1997) . This scholarship is unequivocal, I believe, in its contention that method follows from and must be determined by our own theories about what validity and truth are, and thus how they must be found. This means that much of the behavioral science literature has put the cart before the horse. Much of this literature has made theoretical commitments and ruled out certain truth claims through its methods, without deliberately meaning to do so. In other words, many mainstream researchers are allowing unexamined philosophical commitments-that are implicit in their method-to set limits on how they view their subject matter, before any investigation of the subject matter itself has occurred. forgot-or perhaps never wanted to know-that this so-called neutral method had distinctly philosophical origins; it was never given to scientists on divine tablets. It was formulated and developed by very biased philosophers, with particular axes to grind and a particular view of the world to promote.
Let me be clear: I am not saying the these particular "axes" are necessarily wrong. I am not interested, at this juncture, in supporting or refuting the assumptions of universalism, materialism, and atomism. I am interested, instead, in us gaining an understanding of these axes. Such an understanding would enable us to make critical decisions about these axes, given our own research circumstances. The problem is that these axes are now so prevalent and so familiar that they hold the status of axioms. As I have found in my own experiences-both of myself as a researcher and of my patients in clinical practice-there is a tremendous temptation to think that "familiar is better." In this case, the familiar may, in fact, be better. However, until we have seriously considered alternative assumptions, such as those offered us by the postmodernists, we simply cannot know. In the meantime, unexamined methodological assumptions may be ruling out potentially promising research ideas, and important theories are being operationalized in ways that may distort their true nature. We must begin the process of consciousness raising now, and I am excited to be a part of a conference that is attempting to do just that.
